However, in general, international law is not always easy to convert into ‘hard’ law. Many reasons may be considered for this. One of the reasons and possibly the most obvious is the fact that there is no supreme body with the authority to make the laws and ensure compliance. Another not too unrelated reason is the fact that all the states are at different levels economically and in terms of development and therefore, the same level of compliance can not be reasonably expected of all states. Also, because of this diversity, all states parties are not always actively involved in negotiations for a new agreement either because they are not invited or because even when they are represented, they do not have the technical know-how to understand the negotiations and the consequences of the new law for them. The main reason though, is that considering all the other reasons and the sheer number of parties (both state and non state) involved in negotiations and who have stakes in the outcome, it is really difficult to arrive at an agreement that everyone would be happy with. In the realm of environmental protection in particular, the sensitivity of the area and its close relation to matters of trade and economics as well as state sovereignty pose additional problems. Other problems are posed by the fact that sometimes one can not be sure of the environmental impact of something until such a thing happens.Rather than go without any form of guideline at all, the parties usually opt for ‘soft law’ in the form of instruments such as codes of practice, resolutions, and declarations of principles, standards, and guidelines usually within the context of ‘framework’ treaties. They are clearly not law but they do not completely lack authority (Birnie and Boyle, 2002; p25). They can at least provide a focal point for the consideration by states when debating the application of particular treaties.