美国作业代写:艾森豪威尔眼

Keywords:美国作业代写

在艾森豪威尔眼中，后勤部分的成功同样重要的是利用空中资产，不仅缓和了德国在海滩上的防御，而且在盟军登陆之前破坏、摧毁和解除德国的运输和供应方式。尽管有盟军指挥官的疑虑，“运输计划”还是被采纳了。其中一个更具争议点的入侵计划，这是艾森豪威尔坚定坚持这个计划的战术细节，将证明成功的霸主。而航空指挥官想继续打在德国工业的心脏，轰炸柏林，和德国制造中心，艾森豪威尔青睐的战术打击的桥梁，在他登陆支援德国市郊铁路和点沟通阻碍德国动用其储备能力。[战争结束后7】虽然很多质疑这个计划进行了批判，其结果，Stephen Ambrose指出，“那些知道最好的位置，德国将领们，是他们的信念，各种空气袭击破坏他们的反攻计划强。”[ 8 ]这些评论和许多类似的支持盟军计划和坚持原则的修正地应用在战场上执行的是比人和机器进行，计划更重要。除了他的空中力量的应用，艾森豪威尔的愿景，用他的空降部队超越传统使用的空降部队被创造–“分大小”的值为战略而比战术。[ 9 ]空气不会被用于攻击点，而后面的线，确保关键的桥梁，切断反击尽他们可能直到入侵部队可以安全的海滩。艾森豪威尔违背了谷物，违背了一切实际和建议的军事领导人员利用空中力量和空降部队。
美国作业代写:艾森豪威尔眼
Equally important in Eisenhower’s eyes to the success of the logistical portion was the use of air assets to not only soften German defenses on the beaches, but also to disrupt, destroy and disarm German modes of transportation and supply in advance of the Allied landings. The “Transportation Plan” as it was called was adopted despite misgivings from Allied commanders. One of the more highly contested points in the invasion plan, it was Eisenhower’s firm insistence on this plan’s tactical details that would prove successful in OVERLORD. While the air commanders wanted to continue to hit at the heart of the German industrial complex, bombing Berlin, and other centers of German manufacturing, Eisenhower favored tactical strikes on bridges, railways and points of communication on the outskirts of Germany in support of his landing and to hamper German ability to mobilize its reserves.[7] While many questioned this plan and were critical of its results after the war, Stephen Ambrose points out that “those in the best position to know, the German Generals, were ‘strong in their belief that the various air attacks were ruinous to their counter-offensive plans.’”[8] These comments and many others like them support the Allied plan and uphold the notion that doctrine correctly applied and executed on the battlefield is of greater importance than the men and machines used to carry out that plan.In addition to his application of air power, Eisenhower’s vision for the use of his airborne units extended beyond the traditional use for which airborne units were created – as “division-size” whose value was strategic rather than tactical.[9] The airborne would not be used at the point of attack, but rather behind the lines, securing key bridges and cutting off counterattacks as best they could until the invasion forces could secure the beaches. Eisenhower went against the grain and went contrary to all that was practical and recommended by his military leadership staff for exploiting the air power and airborne units.