GFC提出了一个关于金融监管缺失的重要论点;是否足以预防未来的金融危机。会议明确表示，金融监管需要一种协调和协调的宏观审慎方式，以及银行体系的公司治理。因此，2000年后的市场和宏观经济状况要求公司治理的行动方针中，董事会必须清楚组织的技术和风险渴望，并以一种方便的方式作出反应，需要富有成效的报告制度。公司治理的作用是保护和促进股东的利益。财务报告委员会(FRC)是英国公司治理的监管机构。英国《公司治理准则》就董事会的生存能力和与股东的关系制定了良好实践的标准。Merino等人认为，公众对公司治理体系的信心减弱，需要重新考虑现有的公司治理模式，以恢复这种信心，并解决与管理和治理关系相关的问题。这一发现表明，公司治理可以在决定个别公司行为方面发挥重要作用，尤其是在困难时期，内部人士征用少数股东的动机。银行有传染风险;因为它们之间的联系非常紧密，如果一家银行在英国破产，它不仅会在英国造成严重后果，还会造成全球性后果。在全球金融危机期间，大多数银行都存在疏忽、无能和鲁莽，因此，伦敦银行同业拆借利率(LIBOR)丑闻开始逼近。因此，在金融危机期间，银行已经遇到了财务困难，因此没有动机将伦敦银行同业拆借利率(LIBOR)压低。2013年取代FSA的金融市场行为监管局(FCA)和审慎监管局(PRA)开始采用一种名为“可信威慑”的新政策，这意味着对银行采取更严厉的方法，对违法者实施更积极的惩罚。吕志和认为，在金融危机后，PRA和FCA在实施制裁方面的力度要大得多，这是朝着更有效的公司治理迈出的良好一步。此外，FCA引入了高级经理制度(SMR)，从本质上讲，银行董事的审批程序现在比危机前更为严格。此外，根据《2013年银行业改革法案》(Banking Reform Act 2013)的要求，PRA在2014年引入了新的保险行业问责机制。PRA认为，应该有一个监管框架，加强对在保险公司和银行担任责任职位的个人的适当性和恰当性、行为和问责性的类似标准。
The GFC elevated a critical argument about the omissions of financial regulation; whether or not it is sufficient to prevent future financial crises. It was made clear that the financial regulation needed a co-ordinated and harmonised macro-prudential approach, as well as, corporate governance in the banking system. Thus, the post-2000 market and macro-economic condition requested the most out of corporate governance courses of action, boards must be clear about the technique and hazard craving of the organisation and to react in a convenient way, requiring productive reporting system. The role of corporate governance is to protect and advance the interests of shareholders. The Financial Reporting Council (FRC), is the regulator for corporate governance in the UK. The UK Corporate Governance Code sets out the standards of good practice with regard to the board viability and the relation with shareholders. Merino et al. suggest that weakened public confidence in the corporate governance system brought to the top of the policy agenda the need to reconsider the existing corporate governance models to restore this confidence and to address problems associated with management and governance relations. The finding suggests that corporate governance can play an important role in determining individual firms’ behaviour, in particular, the incentives of insiders to expropriate minority shareholders during times of distress.Banks have a contagion risk; because they are very much inter-connected, if a bank fails in the UK it will not only have ramification in the UK but also a worldwide consequences. During the GFC most banks were negligent, incompetence and reckless, therefore, the LIBOR scandal started to approach. So, during the financial crises the banks were experiencing financial difficulties already and therefore there was not an incentive to keep the LIBOR rate down. The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), which replaced the FSA in 2013, and The Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) started adopting a new policy called creditable deterrence, which means that a harsher methodology towards banks and a lot more proactive in enforcing penalties against wrongdoers. Lui is in the view of, that the PRA and FCA have been a lot more forceful in enforcing sanctions post the crisis and this is a good step towards more effective corporate governance. Moreover, The FCA introduced the Senior Managers Regime (SMR), essentially, the approval process to become a director of a bank is now stricter than before the crisis.In addition, The PRA in 2014 introduced a new accountability regime regarding the insurance sector, as required by the Banking Reform Act 2013. The PRA believes that there should be a regulatory framework, which reinforces similar standards of fitness and propriety, conduct, and accountability for individuals in positions of responsibility at both insurers and banks.